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ABSTRACT 
The prevailing stage for conversations about politics and morality has shifted from 
private and face-to-face to public and digital. Moreover, the digital landscape itself changed 
considerably in the past decade. The era of static webpages has been replaced by dynamic social 
networks where ideas and reactions to events spread rapidly. With every comment we, or a 
political adversary makes, numbers quantifying social approval tick up or down. Instead of 
holding digitized versions of one-on-one conversations, we argue in front of audiences who 
throw digital “points” at and accelerate the spread of the winning side’s ideas. I argue this 
subjectively raises the stakes of moral and political discussions online, causing us to forego 
civility to combat the spread of ideas we oppose. Two experiments and one study of real-world 
interactions on Twitter test whether outrage and negative moral emotional language are triggered 
not only by the outrage inducing content on social media, but by their potential to spread and 
gain influence—to go viral. Furthermore, I test whether people use outrage strategically when 
trying to coordinate others against a target. Study 1 showed participants (N = 240) several 
animations of Tweets going viral (or not) in their first 12 hours. As predicted, outrage inducing 
content triggered greater subjective outrage and the desire to act when it went viral. Study 2 
replicates this relationship in real world interactions between conservatives and liberals on 
Twitter (N = 22,092 tweet-reply pairs). In cross-ideological replies (e.g., liberals replying to 
conservatives), highly viral tweets attracted replies with twice the number of anger and negative-
moral emotional words than non-viral tweets on average. No such relationship was observed in 
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homogeneous replies (e.g., liberals replying to liberals). Lastly, Study 3 explicitly instructed 
participants (N = 150) to either write replies to coordinate others against (i.e., downvote) another 
commenter or write replies they thought would cause others to reward (i.e., upvote) them 
personally. As predicted, explicit goals to coordinate audiences against a target triggered 
substantially more outrage expressions than attempts to gain personal rewards—even in the 
absence of changes in subjective outrage. Thus the viral spread of opposing ideas triggers 
outrage, which we use strategically to counter the threat of virality. In sum, talking about 
morality and politics with people who do not see the world as we do is already incredibly 
difficult. The present results suggest that “keeping score” of who is winning further impedes our 
chances at understanding one another.    
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INTRODUCTION 
On a 2018 episode of his podcast, Ezra Klein, editor in chief for Vox, described a shift in 
the tone of online discussions. In the early days of the online “blog-sphere,” he did not live in 
fear of scrolling down to the comments section below his posts. Disagreements felt sincere and 
non-threatening. As social media shifted from an era of static webpages to one of dynamic social 
networks filled with public markers of social approval, he felt a new kind of anxiety. 
Uncalculated miss-steps suddenly provoked mobs threatening attacks against his colleagues’ and 
friends’ reputations. People did not seem to argue to learn from one another anymore. They 
wanted to bring each other down, to see people barred from the conversation, even lose their 
jobs. Anecdotes like Klein’s are easy to come by. People across the political spectrum describe 
growing concern over social media “pile-ons” in the overwhelming numbers made possible by 
social media. As the digital landscape shifted from static web pages to the modern era of 
dynamic social networks, it gained new social information—numbers quantifying social 
approval. Whether it be in the form of “likes,” “retweets,” or “upvotes,” every major social 
media site broadcasts a score for the reception and impact of everything we post. Later in his 
podcast, Klein places the blame of rampant digital outrage squarely on the shoulders of these 
public markers of social reward. Coming to an understanding with people who do not share our 
worldview is already a difficult task, one that becomes even more difficult when it takes place in 
front of an audience throwing digital points at whichever side they think is winning. Social 
media takes conversations about morality that already contain aversive, opposing worldviews, 
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and embeds them in information that those views are spreading and gaining favor. In other 
words, social media raises the stakes of political conversation, causing us to resort to the nastiest 
tools in our repertoire to combat the worldviews we oppose.   
I argue that social media encourages outrage in the service of social coordination. We 
condemn others to make a social impact, to change minds, and to rally people to our side of a 
dispute. We make moral appeals to resolve disputes over important decisions, like how to 
properly distribute resources or how to treat people who deviate from cultural norms about 
sexuality. Moral outrage and condemnation are two of our most powerful tools for shifting 
public opinion. The threat of opposing views going viral and spreading rapidly online may 
encourage us to use these tools more frequently in ideologically cross-cutting conversations.  
  Recently, others have argued that digital outrage is largely motivated by “virtue 
signaling,” or the desire to appear morally good to others (Jordan & Rand, 2019). Introducing 
public markers of social approval into our interactions likely has multiple effects upon how we 
talk to one another. The signaling and coordinative functions of condemnation likely combine to 
account for the pervasiveness of outrage and shaming on social media. Thus, I argue these are 
complementary, rather than competing perspectives. However, while a variety of work attributes 
digital outrage to virtue signaling motivations (Grubbs, Warmke, Tosi, James, & Campbell, 
2019; Johnen, Jungblut, & Ziegele, 2018; Jordan & Rand, 2019), little work has examined its 
coordinative function. I review both the signaling and coordinative motivations for digital 
outrage and explore how the modern era of social media facilitates both. Then, I conduct three 
studies providing an initial demonstration of the coordinative roots of digital outrage. More 
specifically, I demonstrate that 1) seeing opposing coalitions form online prompts outrage in 
both an online experiment and in real world conversations on Twitter and 2) people use outrage 
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strategically when they have an explicit goal to coordinate others against a target. Combined 
these studies provide initial evidence that digital outrage is triggered by the virality of our 
political adversaries and employed strategically to combat their spread.  
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OUTRAGE AS VIRTUE SIGNALING 
One of the key insights of early research studying online interactions is the control they 
provide over self-presentation (Wallace, 1999). Whether it be through Snapchat filters, the 
pictures we post on Instagram, or in the information we include in our Facebook bios, social 
media lets us choose what aspects of ourselves we show the world. Digital networks also let us 
control the information that invades our news feeds. We choose who to follow, friend, block and 
talk to on sites like Facebook and Twitter. This enhanced control over who we interact with can 
be especially liberating and make us feel more comfortable sharing our true selves with one 
another (McKenna, Green, & Gleason, 2002). Moral traits lie at the center of our true selves 
(Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014), and the Internet provides ubiquitous opportunities to talk 
about our values. People witness more immoral acts online than in person or via traditional 
media (Crockett, 2017), roughly half of Americans report being civically active on social media, 
and 37% say social media is an important venue for expressing their political convictions (PEW, 
2018). The sudden explosion of opportunities to communicate our moral traits to like-minded 
others and reap social rewards offers one explanation for the rise of outrage culture.  
Partner choice models of human interaction help explain why our moral reputations are 
so important to us (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013). Researchers often examine cooperation 
using economic games, or lab studies in which groups of people make decisions about how to 
distribute resources. One version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, assigns participants to 
interact with a single interaction partner in which they can choose to cooperate or act selfishly 
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over repeated trials. An effective tactic for encouraging cooperation in is to engage in a tit-for-tat 
strategy (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), cooperating when one’s partner does so and punishing 
selfish behavior by returning the favor. Tit-for-tat strategies reflect a narrow type of morality, 
one centered on reciprocity. But Baumard and colleagues (2013) argue this paradigm cannot 
explain the emergence of human’s moral sense in its entirely. Partner choice models (Barclay, 
2016; Noe & Hammerstein, 1993) posit that taking an “eye for an eye” is often not our only 
recourse when faced with a selfish partner. In many, if not most exchanges, we also have the 
option of choosing another interaction partner with a better reputation for cooperation. Under 
models allowing for partner choice, one’s reputation suddenly acquires a great deal of value (Fu, 
Hauert, Nowak, & Want, 2008). Reaping the benefits of cooperation depends upon successfully 
signaling you are a dependable exchange partner who will share costs and benefits equally.  
Both historical and experimental evidence demonstrate that partner choice encourages 
cooperation. From traders in medieval Europe (McAdams, 1997) to Jewelers in New York 
(Bernstein, 1992), partners throughout history have made deals even in the absence of judicial 
oversight. The irreparable costs of exclusion from cooperation motivate people to deal fairly. 
When other partner options are present, developing a reputation for unfair transactions leads 
potential partners to choose others when exchanging good and services. Moreover, experimental 
evidence consistently finds that people choose exchange partners based on their reputation for 
cooperation (Barclay, 2006; 2013; Barclay & Willer, 2006; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011; 
Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 2013; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). People can effectively infer 
their partners’ penchant for cooperation by tuning into details like how spontaneously they 
choose to behave pro-socially (Verplaese, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007). People also predict 
better than chance whether a future partner will cooperate in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas if 
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they have an unrelated conversation beforehand (Brosig, 2002). Because our potential as 
cooperation partners is under constant surveillance, communicating our reputation as a fair 
interaction partner requires vigilance. So much vigilance in fact, that Baumard and colleagues 
(2013) argue genuine concerns for fairness emerged to motivate behavior signaling our 
suitability as exchange partners.   
Consistent with the benefits of reputation signaling, we present ourselves in ways that 
accrue benefits, recognition, and favorable views (Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalsky, 1990; 
Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). Moral traits hold special status in self-presentation. Feeling judged 
as immoral carries greater weight than being judged as incompetent (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 
2007), people are more likely to exaggerate the morality of their own behavior than their 
intelligence (Allison, Messick, and Goethals, 1989), they are willing submerge their hands in 
worms and icy water in order to avoid damage to their reputations (Vonasch, Reynolds, 
Winegard, & Baumeister, 2017), and changes in moral traits have a significantly larger impact 
on self-perceived identity than changes in personality traits, memories, preferences, basic 
cognitive capacities, perceptual abilities, and physical features (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; 
2015). Groups respond defensively to moral identity threats (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & 
Rothschild, 2012), they compete more fiercely for moral than material status (Leach, et al., 
2007), and they compete for victim status in order to gain the moral high ground (Young & 
Sullivan, 2016). People care more deeply about how they are perceived in moral terms than 
perhaps any other qualities.  
 Humans take advantage of what signals are available to communicate their moral 
reputations. Given the opportunity to make moral judgments in front of others, demonstrating a 
committing to moral duty (i.e., deontological judgments) reliably signals trustworthiness to 
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audiences (Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018; Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016; Rom 
& Conway, 2018; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). Everyday life is not filled with moral 
dilemmas for us to solve publicly; however, prosocial behavior, such as sharing, is a powerful 
signal for reputation that brings rewards (Jordan & Rand, 2017; 2019). In the absence of 
opportunities to behave prosocially we often take advantage of a signal that stands in stark 
contrast to helping behavior: condemnation. In economic games, when participants do not have 
the option to share resources as a signal of trustworthiness, participants’ look to each other’s 
tendency to punish selfish players when deciding with whom to cooperate (Barclay, 2006; Jordan 
et al., 2016; Nelissen, 2008). Moreover, choosing cooperation partners based on their 
punishment history actually leads to better outcomes for cooperation (Jordan et al., 2016). Third-
party punishment provides a viable option to signal trustworthiness to potential cooperative 
partners, and people increase their punishment of transgressors in front of audiences (Kurzban, 
DeScioli, & O’Brien, 2007). 
 In short, we care deeply about whether others view us as good and fair, we go to great 
lengths to protect our reputations, and doing so brings a host of social rewards. Theories drawing 
from partner choice models argue the centrality of our moral identities stems from their ability to 
boost our chances of being chosen as cooperation partners. We employ several strategies for 
signaling our reputations to others, one of which is punishing moral transgressors in front of 
audiences. While multiple options for signaling moral traits exist, the Internet may be especially 
effective at increasing the viability of condemnation as a signaling strategy.  
Virtue Signaling in Digital Space 
Communications researchers, social psychologists and organizational psychologists have 
all written on the defining characteristics of computer mediated and digital communication. This 
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literature stretches as far back as theories of social presence in communication science over four 
decades ago (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976). Social presence theory and media richness 
theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986) focus on deficiencies in nonverbal, paraverbal, and other social 
context clues in computer mediated communication. More recently, social psychologists Katelyn 
McKenna and John Bargh (2002) highlighted four differences in communication over the 
Internet compared with face-to-face interactions: social anonymity, the irrelevance of physical 
distance for interaction partners, the unimportance of physical appearance and visual cues for 
relationship formation, and greater control over the time and pacing of social interaction. Finally, 
organizational psychologists emphasize the richness of information transmitted and the 
synchronicity of communication as key dimensions (Kirkman & Mathieu, 2005).  
But computer mediated environments have changed vastly since researchers began 
investigating the effects of communicating via email in organizations. The Internet has 
transformed from an era characterized by static web pages in the early 2000s to the constantly 
shifting and reacting nature of social media. The characteristics of modern digital environments 
may facilitate the signaling function of outrage expression. First, web users have considerable 
control over what groups they choose to engage with online, making it easier to selectively 
express outrage among groups who will respond positively. Second, the Internet provides near 
unlimited access to morally relevant discussions that reward outrage expression. Social media 
provides concrete indicators of social approval in the form of “likes” and “upvotes” (i.e., buttons 
users press to show their approval to others) that give concrete, quantified feedback for moral 
reputation unlike anything in face-to-face reactions (in which approval must either being inferred 
from others behavior or is simply not available because the vast audiences of digital networks are 
impossible).  
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Opportunities for Expression and Reward  
In a reanalysis of data tracking everyday moral experiences (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, 
& Skitka, 2014), Crockett (2017) finds that people are more likely to learn about immoral acts 
online than in person or via traditional media. Moreover, immoral acts encountered in digital 
media tend to be more extreme and outrage inducing than the more mundane transgression (e.g., 
being cut off in traffic, seeing someone jaywalk, etc.) encountered in face-to-face contexts. Prior 
to the advent of digital media, information about people’s moral character spread through our 
local social networks via gossip to inform judgments about trustworthiness and cooperation with 
others in local communities. Much of the information we encounter about the moral character of 
companies, politicians, celebrities, or other public figures comes from news organizations 
seeking to gain traffic ad revenue from users. This provides a financial incentive for the creation 
of especially outrageous “click bait” to attract web users to sites that depend upon “clicks” for ad 
revenue. The steady, repeated exposure to especially outrage-inducing content in digital media, 
which one would rarely otherwise encounter in person, offers numerous opportunities to 
condemn others.  
Comments on social media are also met with concrete social feedback. Social approval 
activates the reward centers of the brain (Meshi, Morawetz, & Heekeren, 2013; Sherman, 
Payton, Hernandex, Greenfield, & Dapretto, 2016), facilitates learning (Ruff & Fehr, 2014) and 
boosts self-esteem (Burrow & Rainone, 2017). Beyond the immediate rewards of digital 
feedback, Crockett (2017) argues that people deliver “likes” and “favorites” in patterns 
resembling variable interval reinforcement schedules which are especially effective at forming 
habits (Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983). Thus social media provide ubiquitous 
opportunities for reputation reinforcement, which may produce widespread expressions of 
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outrage out of habits engrained by unpredictable patterns of social rewards. In short, social media 
amplify both the opportunities and rewards for signaling our moral traits through condemnation.  
Audience Filtering Online 
The control social media grants its users over social interaction may make condemnation 
a more viable strategy for signaling virtues. Punishing free riders or moral norm violators often 
provokes retaliation (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008). Individuals who punish others for 
unfairly allocating resources in economic games often receive retaliatory punishments, a 
phenomenon labelled “antisocial punishment” (Rand & Nowak, 2011). Moreover, publicly 
condemning a divisive position risks alienating those with dissimilar attitudes. Even people who 
are most supportive of diversity broadly withhold their tolerance for moral diversity (Haidt, 
Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003), and people attribute bad character to targets who disagree with their 
moral judgments about disgust inducing transgressions (Katzir, 2017). Risks of retaliation from 
detractors may be especially large in today’s political climate as views towards ideological 
opponents have grown increasingly negative in recent decades (PEW, 2016). While public 
condemnation holds potential benefits (Barclay & Kiyonari, 2014; Jordan & Rand, 2017; Jordan, 
et al., 2016; Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Santos et al., 2013) the costs of public punishment limits 
its prevalence in traditional social interactions (Guala, 2012). However, digital environments 
may sidestep a number of these risks while preserving the utility of punishment for signaling 
moral reputation. Social media grants users increased control over the audiences of their 
condemnation, allowing users to segregate themselves into ideological bubbles of like-minded 
others. Furthermore, fears of uncomfortable social interactions or even physical retaliation are 
less tenable for interactions mediated by a computer screen. Thus the cost-benefit ratio for 
condemnation may become more favorable in digital contexts.  
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 The Internet allows us to selectively expose ourselves to information that agrees with our 
worldview. People consistently prefer associating with similar others. We embed ourselves in 
social networks comprising homogenous sociodemographic, behavior, and intrapersonal 
characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) and migrate so our neighbors share our 
political views (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014). Consumers gravitate to news 
from sources that share their ideology (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Munson & Resnick, 2010), and 
news aggregators take advantage of this by recommending content that aligns with our ideology 
(Pariser, 2011). Some commentators, such as Cass Sunstein, have predicted digital communities 
to form echo chambers of like-minded individuals reinforcing one another’s views and fostering 
polarization (2018). While evidence that digital echo chambers are undermining democracy or 
fostering extreme opinions is mixed (Tucker et a., 2018), digital environments do appear to at 
least provide the tools for filtering out attitudinally dissimilar others. 
 Social media may feed our homophilous tendencies even further than traditional media. 
We naturally tend to follow and friend more like-minded others without deliberation (Aiello et 
al., 2012). Moreover, websites like Twitter give users direct control over the content appearing in 
their newsfeeds, allowing them to exclusively follow ideologically similar accounts if they 
choose. Facebook lets users mute disagreeable friends and make one’s posts invisible to specific 
people. Other discussion forums like reddit.com feature sub-forums created specifically for 
people of a given ideology. For example, the wiki for r/conservative, Reddit’s forum discussing 
conservative perspectives, describes itself in the following manner: 
 
“We are not fair and balanced. We don't pretend to be unbiased. We don't pretend to give 
all commenters equal time. This is by conservatives and for conservatives. We are here to 
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discuss conservative topics from a distinctly conservative point of view. If you don't like 
that it's not an unbiased forum, go ask why /r/politics is a leftist totalitarian state. Leftists 
and moderates have never been welcomed here. If you wander in here and spout 
nonsense or insult us, don't be surprised when we ban you almost instantly.” 
 
While the most comprehensive analyses do not suggest mass ideological segregation 
online (Eady, Nagler, Guess, Zilinsky, & Tucker, 2019; Tucker et al., 2018), examples of web 
users taking advantage of social media’s filtering tools is well-documented. Twitter users tend to 
form politically homogenous clusters (Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 2013), and political 
tweets are retweeted more frequently within (vs across) ideological groups (Brady, Wills, Jost, 
Tucker, & Van Bavel, 2017). Liberal Facebook users’ friend networks comprise less than 20% 
conservative and more than 60% liberal, while conservatives’ networks mirror this pattern 
almost perfectly (Bakshy, Messing, Adamic, 2015). Moreover, just as third parties are more 
likely to punish moral transgressors face-to-face when punishment is backed by consensus 
(Konishi, Oe, Shimizu, Tanaka, & Ohstudbo, 2017), so too are Facebook users selectively less 
willing to condemn others on social media if they believe their followers disagree with them 
(Hampton, Rainie, Dwyer, Shin, & Purcell, 2014). People who sense incongruency between their 
opinion and the national climate also report less willingness to post comments on moral issues 
(Gearhart & Zhang, 2014).    
 Examinations of participation in online firestorms (i.e., collective panics in response to 
perceived threats to cherished values) find users selectively comment to maximizes potential 
reputational payoff (Johnen et al., 2018). Given a high volume of outrage directed at a moral 
norm violation online, participants become less willing to write a comment of their own. The 
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authors argue that high volumes of previously expressed outrage undermine opportunities to 
stand out and gain social recognition, rendering outrage an ineffective signal of personal 
reputation. This also helps explain why online fire-storms are typically short lived (Pfeffer, 
Zorbach, & Carley, 2014). Field studies on Twitter support the negative relationship between 
pre-existing comments and willingness to comment oneself. As the number of pre-existing 
replies increases, previous commenters become less likely to comment again on a Twitter thread 
covering a political topic (Shugars & Beauchamp, 2019). In other words, if a user replies to a 
Tweet, leaves for some time, then returns to find the Twitter thread has received many 
comments, they are less likely to comment again than if a relatively small number of replies had 
been made. Again, one interpretation of these results is that users choose not to express outrage 
or engage in heated arguments when their comments are likely to be lost in the crowd.  
Summary: Digital Outrage as a Reputation Signal 
 The signaling perspective offers one explanation of why outrage culture feels pervasive 
on social media. We care deeply about our moral reputations and public condemnation 
effectively signals our moral qualities. While traditional, face-to-face exchanges provide limited 
and risky opportunities for condemnation, digital networks provide an unlimited supply of 
transgressors to safely condemn in our networks of like-minded others. From this view, mobs 
expressing extreme degrees of outrage stem from their members’ attempts to make their signals 
stand out from the crowd. We condemn others and express outrage to amplify the signal of our 
reputation. This does not imply that outrage is feigned or not genuinely felt (Jordan & Rand, 
2019). Part of the reason we feel our moral convictions so intensely is because the motivation to 
signal and protect our reputations is adaptive (Baumard et al., 2013). To the extent that outrage 
culture is motivated by signaling, homophily may dominate social networks in order to maximize 
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the chance of outrage expression resulting in social rewards. While “echo chamber” does not 
accurately describe large segments of digital networks, considerable evidence demonstrates that 
people do frequently take advantage of the filtering capabilities of digital media.  
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OUTRAGE AS SOCIAL COORDINATION 
The signaling perspective excels at explaining outrage in “echo chambers.” If outrage 
culture takes root in the motivation to reap social rewards from publicly condemning our 
opponents, then surrounding ourselves with people who share our convictions will yield those 
rewards most consistently. But many interactions on social media are between ideological 
opponents (Eady et al., 2019; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Yardi & Boyd, 2010). Moreover, 
outrage also exists in completely anonymous platforms (e.g., Reddit) where it is impossible to 
signal personal reputation. Proponents of the signaling perspective argue that even in anonymous 
contexts, we still engage in costly punishment as a heuristic (Jordan & Rand, 2019). In other 
words, even in situations where condemnation cannot boost our reputations, we still try to signal 
them via condemnation as a general rule. Alternatively, the functions of outrage expression may 
extend beyond virtue signaling. Surely sometimes people argue with and condemn others 
because they are genuinely motivated to shape the moral rules that constrain and reward how 
people treat one another. Outrage is often our best tool for fighting for the principles we believe 
in, for undermining the reputations of our opponents, and rallying allies to our side in moral 
disagreements. Condemnation is not only a signal of personal virtue; it is how we dictate the 
sides people choose in conflict.  
The Side-Taking Perspective on Morality 
In the film Black Panther, the people of Wakanda, a fictional civilization in sub-Saharan 
Africa, enjoy a host of fantastic, futuristic technologies—from levitating chariots and 
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superpowered suits to bracelets capable of healing gunshot wounds. At the same time, Wakanda 
employs a much older method for settling competing claims to the throne: trial by combat. In the 
real world, ancient judicial systems used trials by ordeal in which the accused were subjected to 
some painful, usually dangerous experience, and escaping unscathed was taken as proof of 
innocence. The outcome of the trial makes it easy for groups in disagreement to choose a side. 
Throwing an accused witch into a lake to see if they float as a test of guilt creates a visible signal 
for social coordination. Similarly, pitting two would-be kings against one another in a fight to the 
death makes it easy to choose a ruler afterwards. But fights to the death have limitations, like 
allowing a murderous villain to ascend to the throne by out-dueling a more caring and wiser 
opponent. If you have watched the pivotal scene in Black Panther where this happens, you might 
have heard a voice in your head screaming, “Forget the trial by combat! Don’t give the villain 
the crown because he’s a horrible, horrible person!” Morality is an incredibly useful tool for 
settling disputes. Choosing a side not because they are powerful or because they are our friends 
but because they are good often results in superior outcomes. Of course the people of Wakanda 
do use their moral sense to coordinate against the villain by the end of the film, but not soon 
enough to avoid the costs of side-taking strategies void of moral input.   
DeScioli and Kurzban’s (2013) side-taking model of morality argues condemnation is 
one of our best tools for navigating disputes over resources, rulers, and all the other potentially 
costly disagreements humans encounter. Moral condemnation has clear advantages over other 
strategies for social coordination. In the absence of moral appeals, humans typically choose sides 
based on whichever disputant has the most power or based on pre-existing alliances with one of 
the disputants. Both these strategies bring unique limitations. The former lowers the cost of 
conflicts but ultimately leads to despotism with the same individuals consistently reaping the 
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greatest rewards and maintaining power. The latter often leads to costly conflicts between sides 
entrenched in alliances. DeScioli and Kurzban (2013) propose that moral appeals allow for more 
dynamic coordination. Granting one side the moral high ground creates a signal visible to 
onlookers that side-steps the traps of despotism and justifies forsaking pre-existing alliances.  
In support of their condemnation centered model, DeScioli and Kurzban point to 
observations that moral judgments are frequently not based on promoting group welfare, that 
they track rule violations rather than benefits (Mikhail, 2007), that moral principles themselves 
are frequently damaging to groups (Ryan, 2014), and that behavior is far more motivated by 
appearing moral than by actually following moral principles (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). 
Condemnation is a weapon capable of destroying opponents’ reputations, depriving them of 
friends, and recruiting their former allies to one’s side. Moral disgust motivates people to avoid 
targets of blame (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Molho, Tybur, Guler, 
Balliet, & Hofmann, 2017; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009), moral condemnation puts 
one at risks of exclusion and exploitation from communities (Opotow, 1990), moralization drives 
groups to act on their sides’ cause, increasing political action and the acceptability of violent 
means to achieve morally justified ends (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), and 
lacking social support predicts an increased tendency to moralize or invoke condemnation in an 
attempt to gain social support (Peterson, 2013). Invoking morality both has the power to punish 
opponents and to rally allies in disputes.  
Fighting Over Moral Rules 
For moral judgments to coordinate behavior effectively, we need to agree upon the moral 
rules that will tell us which side is right. Descioli and Kurzban refer to these arguments over 
which rules will coordinate behavior as “moral meta-fights.” Both across time and culture, fights 
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over moral rules have produced diverse sets of principles to guide behavior. Views towards 
corporal punishment, slavery, civil rights, human sexuality, and animal rights have shifted 
considerably over human history (Pinker, 2010), and local moralities continue to show 
extraordinary cross-cultural heterogeneity (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). This also allows moral 
rules to prohibit harmless or beneficial behaviors, like interest bearing loans or same-sex 
relationships—if the people who benefit from these rules can convince their communities to 
adopt them. But destructive moral norms are not bugs in the system. They demonstrate the 
flexibility of the moral domain and its susceptibility to being co-opted in the service of diverse 
coordination goals.  
Moral rules cannot coordinate effectively amidst disagreement. This is partly why we 
find moral disagreements so aversive. We do not tolerate moral diversity (Haidt, et al., 2003), 
and we shun close neighbors who embrace moral relativism (Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, & 
Knobe, 2011). Countries often contain groups who have reached different conclusions about the 
rules that will coordinate their behavior. In the United States the political right and left have 
reached consensus on competing rules for things like sexual relationships, how to fairly 
redistribute wealth, and our duties towards non-citizens. Again, people will often go to great 
lengths to simply avoid moral disagreement, even foregoing money (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 
2017). Other times this creates conflict, tugs-of-war over the rules that will dictate behavior. 
Moral outrage and condemnation are some of our most important tools in our fights over moral 
rules.  
 Why do we care about which behaviors our community rewards and punishes? Why 
bother arguing about morality? Why not just conform to whatever rules dominate our immediate 
surroundings? The outcomes of moral rules benefit and harm some more than others. In other 
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words, we care about which principles guide behavior because we often have skin in the game. 
For example, someone with a history of and predilection for sexual promiscuity would suffer if 
their culture suddenly adopted restrictive rules about casual sex. Likewise, the wealthy benefit 
from moral narratives describing taxes as government sanctioned theft. We appeal to morality 
constantly to coordinate people to our cause in disputes. For our rules to effectively coordinate 
behavior, they must hold some degree of consensus. So we argue, and we fight, and we condemn 
those who transgress against them.   
 Consistent with a motivation to fight for specific moral rules (rather than conform 
blindly), evidence from across the moral domain suggests our judgements are often tied to self-
interest. People often engage in behavior they condemn in others when it benefits them (Batson 
& Thompson, 2001), and they judge people who offer them benefits more leniently than 
individuals who do not (Bocian & Wojciszke, 2014). People selectively endorse moral principles 
to support their pre-existing beliefs about racism (Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 
2009). They judge resource distributions that offer more generous payouts to their role in a 
collaborative task as more fair (DeScioli, Massenkoff, Shaw, Peterson, & Kurzban, 2014). Views 
on abortion and recreational drug use are both partly explained by individual differences in 
reproductive strategies (Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2010; Quintelier, Ishii, Weeden, Kurzban, 
& Braeckman, 2013; Weedon, 2003). And membership in higher status groups predicts 
endorsing ideologies that legitimize and maintain group-based hierarchies (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
Of course all our moral convictions are not grounded in self-interest. We can fight for 
moral rules because they benefit others we care about or even because hours of sitting in our 
philosophical armchairs lead us to believe certain principles will create the best world to inhabit. 
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Rules with consequences for our self-interest are the most obvious examples of when we fight 
over moral judgments, but the motivation to push for a specific side of a moral dispute can stem 
from a variety of sources.    
Side-Taking in Digital Space 
When we talk about politics and morality face-to-face, we typically know each other’s 
identities. We see all our opponents’ idiosyncrasies that make them feel like individuals. In 
person arguments about politics often involve a few people talking in private. Condemning 
someone in this context risks alienating close friends who might be listening or provoking 
retaliatory attacks. Moreover, the target of our outrage feels like a real person, not an avatar 
representing the conservative or liberal agenda. But what if we put masks on both sides of a 
dispute, set them on a stage in front of thousands, and hang point totals over their heads tallying 
which side has won the most support from onlookers? This increasingly describes the context of 
political discourse. Virtual environments decrease the risks of condemnation, they transform 
unique individuals into homogenous, moral opponents or allies, and they keep a running a 
running “score” for who is winning the battle over the moral high ground. In face-to-face 
discussion, fighting over moral rules is costly, has limited reach, and is inhibited by our 
perceptions of one another’s humanity. Digital space removes these obstacles, making 
condemnation a more viable coordination strategy.  
Anonymity 
Many digital environments detach users’ online personas from their “real world” 
identities. Anonymity severs the impact of behavior upon personal reputation. This may 
disinhibit behavior online (Suler, 2004), allowing people to self-disclose personal information 
without feeling vulnerable (Bargh & McKenna, 2002) and to behave uncivilly without risking 
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reputational damage (Omernick & Sood, 2013). On the other hand, it may also render the 
signaling function of moral condemnation (Jordan & Rand, 2017) less effective. We cannot 
signal our moral character when our identities are hidden. Thus the impact of anonymity upon 
condemnation is tragic in a certain sense. It allows individuals to escape the risks of attacking 
other’s character, but it also blocks the benefits of condemnation for our own reputation. 
However, anonymity poses no obstacles for outrage in the service of coordination. In fact just the 
opposite, anonymity grants us the freedom to use all the nastiest tools for manipulating moral 
consensus with none of the typical costs of doing so. 
Calling others out is social risky. Punishing free riders or moral norm violators often 
provokes retaliation (Herrmann, et al., 2008). Punishing selfish behavior often generates 
retaliatory punishments, a phenomenon called “anti-social punishment” (Rand & Nowak, 2011). 
Public condemnation reveals our moral convictions, risking the possibility that our peers might 
hold conflicting beliefs. Violations of sacred values are typically met with intolerance and at 
times dangerous responses (Fiske & Rai, 2014). Anonymity minimizes these costs, while having 
no obvious effects on the efficacy of outrage as a coordination device.  
The Salience of Sides 
In the absence of identifying information, group identities often take over. Deprived of 
individuating cues, virtual interactions shift attention to others in terms of their similarity to 
prototypical group members (Lea, Spears, de Groot; 2001) and increase ingroup attraction and 
susceptibility to stereotyping and discrimination (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2002). When we have 
access to fewer social and biographical cues, we rely more upon our beliefs about the groups 
people belong to (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Thus as we enter the digital world, it often 
becomes easier to see each other according to group membership. For topics about politics and 
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morality, those group identities often signify disagreement about which rules should coordinate 
behavior. As we scroll through feeds of different Twitter handles and text arguing about politics, 
we may care less about who people are as individuals and more about “which side they are on.”  
Furthermore, perceiving others as homogenous members of an outgroup has nasty effects 
on intergroup relations. It increases discrimination (Vandeselaere, 1991), facilitates the use of 
aggression by casting outgroups as uniformly evil (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; Wilder, 1986) 
increases ingroup favoritism (Simon, 1992), and predicts seeing the outgroup as more 
threatening (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; Rothgerber, 1997). Socially deprived 
interactions online promote seeing each other in terms of the sides we take, which can facilitate 
using attacks and derogation against one another.  
Consensus information  
Prior to the Internet, the spread of moral reputations depended upon much slower, more 
localized mechanisms such as gossip (Piazza & Bering, 2008). Institutions devised methods to 
rapidly communicate the reputations of deviants or opposing groups through organized 
propaganda or public executions and trials (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). Now the U.S. news 
cycle is filled with stories of a foreign government, Russia, leveraging the consensus shaping 
power of social media to disrupt democracy. Farms with thousands of bots and fake accounts are 
used to spread misinformation and to shape what beliefs appear normal (Broniatowski et al., 
2018; Badawy, Ferrara, & Lerman, 2018). Social media facilitate these efforts by design. 
Televised or printed propaganda have no “retweet” or “like” buttons. A comprehensive analysis 
of 41.7 million Twitter profiles in 2010 found that a single retweet alone leads to an average 
audience of 1,000, regardless of how many followers the original “tweeter” had (Kwak, Lee, 
Park, & Moon, 2010). Share and retweet buttons facilitate the rapid diffusion of information and 
 
 
23 
 
its evaluation, often called virality (Alhabash & McAlister, 2015). Even messages from sources 
with relatively few followers have the potential to go viral in the right time and place.  
Social media, almost by definition, editorialize news. Every story is embedded in 
commentary from the poster and receives a score for social approval. Likes and the dreaded 
Twitter ratio (i.e., a high ratio of replies/favorites for a Tweet is taken to represent disapproval) 
provides a quantified signal of an audience’s consensus. While likes and upvotes feel rewarding 
and tell us when we have successfully communicated our moral traits—hence their relevance to 
virtue signaling—they also tell us which side in a dispute currently holds consensus. They allow 
us to see if an opposing side is rapidly gaining social support versus eliciting backlash. If moral 
condemnation is about coordinating people to specific sides in disputes, then digital likes tell us 
which side is winning. In many ways arguing about politics face-to-face is like competing in a 
game without keeping track of each teams’ points. Conversely, every argument we make on 
social media has the potential to suddenly go viral and wildly swing the score in our side’s favor.     
Evidence for Coordinative Outrage Online 
In some ways social media resemble ideological echo chambers. Analyses of Twitter 
reveal that users are more likely to follow like-minded than dissimilar others (Halberstam & 
Knight, 2016; Hayat & Samuel-Azran, 2017; Himelboim, 2014) and are more likely to “retweet” 
messages from those who share their ideology (Brady et al., 2017; Himelboim, McCreery, & 
Smith, 2013). However, other examinations of digital networks reveal ubiquitous interactions 
between ideological opponents. Social media use is positively associated with exposure to 
politically diverse information (Bae, 2013) and an analysis of Facebook finds that more than 
20% of users’ friends hold opposing views (Bakshy et al.,  2015). The most comprehensive 
analysis of “political bubbles” on Twitter finds that the ideological distributions of accounts 
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followed by extreme conservatives and liberals overlap by 51% (Eady et al, 2019). Social media 
is both homophilous and cross-cutting. This is consistent with multiple functions of online 
discussions about morality. Sometimes we surround ourselves with like-minded others to reap 
social rewards and boost our reputations with more certainty. Other times we argue and fight to 
undermine opponents and shift consensus behind our side’s moral rules.  
When researchers examine replies to original tweets (i.e., writing out a response to 
another user) rather than likes or retweets (i.e., actions only requiring single clicks that signal 
approval for or share others’ posts), ideologically crosscutting interactions increase in 
prevalence. In other words, effortless sharing or liking reflects more homogeneity than 
deliberative replies (Liang, 2014). An analysis of Tweet-reply pairs following the shooting of 
late-term abortion doctor, George Tiller, produced substantial cross-ideological talk, with 396 
out of 1,137 replies representing responses to opposing viewpoints (Yardi & Boyd, 2010), and 
like-minded Tweet-reply pairs constituted only 20% to 40% of total replies during the first 24 
hours following the incident. Moreover, Twitter replies are more emotionally intense than 
original messages, but this pattern is almost entirely driven by course-correction rather than 
amplification. In other words, emotional escalation on Twitter is largely driven by negative 
responses to positive Tweets rather than like-minded response with increased emotional intensity 
(Goldenberg, Gross, & Garcia, 2018). Thus evidence for echo chambers versus crosscutting 
exposure likely depends upon the indicators of social media participation (e.g., written replies 
versus shares) researchers choose. 
Analyses looking specifically at comment sections attached to online news articles find 
further evidence of cross-cutting political exposure. One study of German university students 
found people were especially likely to post online comments if they disagreed with an article or 
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if they wanted to persuade others in the comment sections. Moreover, the motivation to spread 
one’s opinion more strongly predicts satisfaction with posting comments than other motivations, 
such as broadening one’s knowledge or to simply wanting to discuss things with others 
(Springer, Engelmann & Pfaffinger, 2015). A separate field study of comment sections on a local 
news website predicted that incivility targeting political outgroups would increase as proportion 
of ingroup members increased, a prediction consistent with virtue signaling (Rains, Kenski, Coe, 
& Harwood, 2017). Contrary to their predictions, forum users became less likely to speak out 
against and derogate their ideological opponents as members of their ingroup grew in number. 
This pattern fits with coordinative goals, in which users are less motivated to undermine moral 
opponents if the moral consensus already favors the ingroup. 
Other results interpreted as evidence of virtue signaling also have coordinative 
interpretations. For example, several independent studies have found that people are less likely to 
publicly condemn a transgressor or argue with an opponent once other people have already done 
so (Johnen et al., 2018; Sawaoka & Monin, 2018; Shugars & Beauchamp, 2019). Johnen and 
colleagues argue that people are not motivated to express outrage in these cases because it is 
more difficult to stand out from the crowd. Outrage becomes a less noteworthy signal of personal 
virtues when hundreds of others already expressed the same sentiment. While there is likely 
some truth to this explanation, condemning a transgressor also becomes less necessary once 
thousands have already punished it. From the coordinative perspective, seeing coalitions form 
behind an opposing rule or judgment is concerning. If consensus shifts to favor judgments 
opposite our own, the rules we prefer become ineffective guides for coordination. Consistent 
with this, people express more outrage towards transgressions committed by figures who have 
greater power to influence public opinion (Sawaoka & Monin, 2018). We use outrage and  
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Figure 1. Social media facilitate outrage expression through multiple paths. First, social media increase 
exposure to potentially outrage inducing content. However, outrage is a tool with multiple functions. It 
can be used to improve our personal reputations, but it also coordinates people to our side in conflicts, 
helping our side win disputes and achieve its goals. Social media may facilitate both uses of outrage. 
They help use choose audiences that will reward our personal reputations most consistently. They also 
increase the salience of competing sides and broadcast a public “score” for who is winning the dispute—
potentially transforming conversations into competitions. Thus, the present model proposes that digital 
outrage culture is a product of both people trying to signal personal virtues and have genuine impacts 
upon disputes.  
 
shaming to combat opposing coalitions and to rally people to our side. But if the masses have 
already coordinated to condemn our opponents our job has already been done for us. When an 
opponent has already been publicly shamed on Twitter, we do not need to further punish them. 
At that point our side has already won. 
Summary: Outrage to Cooperate, Outrage to Coordinate 
Partner choice models and the side-taking perspective lay the theoretical groundwork for 
the virtue signaling and coordinative functions of digital outrage respectively. Both theories 
emphasize the importance of morality for garnering social support. Outrage in the service of 
virtue signaling conforms to prevailing norms to build personal reputation, making us more 
attractive cooperation partners. Outrage that aims to coordinate, however, drives onlookers 
 
 
27 
 
towards specific moral judgments, whether they be about moral rules, political issues, or specific 
people. The goal is to rally people behind a given issue or cause rather than attract cooperation 
partners. This suggest two different goals for outrage expression. Cooperative outrage conforms 
to prevailing moral norms to build trust and rapport, leading to more successful cooperation. 
Coordinative outrage undermines opposing rules and people to coordinate others towards a 
cause that better serves our vested interests. Sometimes we condemn and shame others to show 
that we are trustworthy, sometimes we do so to ensure specific people or principles lose, gain, or 
maintain power.  
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OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
How did we get to a point where journalists and celebrities live in fear of an outrage mob 
descending upon them? Why do our Twitter and Facebook feeds have so many people yelling at 
each other? One explanation posits that people are trying to show off their moral character in 
front of their social networks. If they are the most outraged out of everyone then that will 
communicate just how much they believe in the cause. When everyone thinks like this, outrage 
mobs quickly spiral out of control. But outrage serves another purpose besides helping us fit in. 
Condemnation also coordinates people against our opponents in disputes. It robs celebrities and 
politicians we disagree with of influence and impels others to join our cause. Fighting over moral 
rules and issues is costly. It alienates friends and the benefits are not always clear. But digital 
media mitigates those risks. All the bickering and nastiness on social media may not just be 
people trying to amplify their personal reputation signal. Instead we may genuinely want to win 
disputes to enact social change, to coordinate behavior in ways relevant to our interests.  
The present studies test two broad predictions that stem from the coordinative function of 
outrage. First, outrage should be felt and employed in response to seeing coalitions with 
opposing rules form. This motivates the use of outrage to protect the moral rules and people who 
help advance our vested interests. This leads to H1 through H3: 
H1: Social media posts from an opposing political party with a high (vs low) number of 
likes/shares will elicit more outrage. 
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Furthermore, opposing posts that have more potential to spread should be especially likely to 
elicit outrage. 
H2: Social media posts from an opposing political party with high (vs low) follower 
counts will elicit more outrage.  
Lastly, witnessing others downvote an opposing coalition should reduce outrage. 
H3: High (vs low) numbers of likes/shares for an opposing view will not increase outrage 
when they receive substantially more dislikes than likes. 
Second, the motivation to undermine an opponent’s reputation should produce greater use of 
condemnation and outrage than the motivation to receive personal reputation boosts. Moreover, 
people will feel especially free to invoke morality and outrage when the costs of expression are 
mitigated by anonymity.  
H4: People instructed to write comments that will cause a moral transgressor to receive 
downvotes (vs. causing people to upvote your comment) will contain more anger and 
moral language. 
H5: People’s replies to a moral transgressor will contain more anger and moral 
language when anonymous than when identified. 
I tested these hypotheses in three studies (see Figure 1 for an overview). Study 1 tested H1-H3 in 
a controlled, online survey using photoshopped webpages. Participants were shown 12 second 
animations of offensive tweets either accumulating a large amount or a very small number of 
retweets over their first 12 hours. Tweets came from accounts with either high or low numbers of 
followers, and some conditions suggested the tweets received substantial backlash. Subjective 
outrage and desire to respond were assessed following each animation. Study 2 tested H1 and H2 
using real world interactions on Twitter in the wake of the Alabama abortion bill in May 2019. I 
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Figure 2. Illustration of goals, methods, outcomes, and hypotheses tested in each study.  
 
compared the anger and negative moral-emotional language of cross-ideological replies to 
Tweets with varying degrees of virality. Lastly, study 3 manipulated the hypothesized 
mechanism in Studies 1 and 2—that outrage is motivated by the goal of undermining opponents 
social support and influence. Study 3 tested H4 and H5 in an online survey of USF students that   
instructed them to either write comments that would make future USF participants upvote them  
personally vs. downvote a potential transgressor. Participants were led to believe their comments 
were either anonymous or identified and human raters scored each comment on outrage, moral 
language, and an exploratory variable, mockery. 
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STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 Procedures and analyses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/n2r7y/. A sample size of 240 
participants was set to detect effect sizes of d = .4 between independent groups with power of 
.80. Participants were collected via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. To ensure familiarity 
with Twitter, people who did not have a Twitter account were excluded from participating using 
a brief screener survey.  This resulted in an original sample of 245 participants. Five participants 
were excluded for failing a practice task requiring them to identify the number of likes and 
retweets in a screenshot of an example tweet (from the National Geographic Twitter account). 
This resulted in a final sample of 240 participants (Mage = 39.72, SDage = 12.41, 59.2% women). 
The main task of the survey showed participants animations of offensive tweets from 
their political outgroup gaining high or low amounts of likes/retweets over time (i.e., high versus 
low virality). At the beginning of the survey, participants indicated whether they leaned 
Republican or Democrat. Democrat participants were shown four profiles identifying as 
conservative Republicans and outrage inducing, right-wing tweets (e.g., “Murder and assault are 
spiraling out of control in cities all over the country thanks to 3rd world aliens who shouldn’t 
even be here”). Republicans were shown profiles of liberal Democrats and outrage inducing, left-
wing tweets (e.g., “Open borders, abolish ICE, citizenship for illegals, yes to all of it. Anything 
that stops this country from being run by a bunch of old white men”). 
 
 
32 
 
Participants were also randomly assigned to see three types of pushback against each 
tweet. In the reply backlash condition, backlash was illustrated as it typically manifests on 
Twitter, through a high reply to like ratio. In other words, Tweets that are disapproved of by 
Twitter users tend to garner a high number of replies relative to the number of likes they receive 
(Roeder, Mehta, & Wezerek, 2017). In this condition, all Tweets accumulated roughly 5-10 
times as many comments as likes. In the “downvote” condition participants were told to imagine 
that Twitter had a downvote button, and to respond as if the tweet received the number of 
downvotes displayed. Tweets accumulated as many downvotes in this condition as they did 
replies in the reply backlash condition. A third, control condition blurred out the portion of the 
tweet displaying the number of comments. See Appendices A-C for materials.  
Participants saw screenshots of four, ostensibly real Twitter profiles and tweets. The 
number of followers each profile had and the number of favorites/retweets each tweet received 
was manipulated within subjects. Two accounts had relatively high follow counts (i.e., 50K – 
80K) and two had relatively low follow counts (100 to 300). Participants were told we tracked 
several real tweets and screenshotted them every few hours. All demographic information was 
blurred out of the tweets and profiles, except for the bio that describes the user as liberal or 
conservative. Participants were then shown two offensive tweets that either 1) accumulated a 
high number of favorites/retweets (i.e., viral tweets with 7K-8K/1K – 2K) over 12 hours or a low 
number (i.e., 3-5/1-3) over 12 hours. Participants saw 5 screenshots of the page, labelled “hour 
0” to “hour 12” at 3-hour intervals. At the “Hour 0” screen, participants were instructed to take a 
moment to read the tweet, then click the arrow button to see how many replies, retweets, and 
likes it accumulated over its first 12 hours. Each subsequent page (for the “3,” “6”, “9,” and “12” 
hour marks) appeared on screen for 3 seconds. The manipulation of virality was independent of 
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the follower count manipulation. In other words, participants all saw tweets from two accounts 
with a large Twitter following (one going viral and one that did not go viral) and two tweets from 
accounts with small Twitter followings (one viral and one non-viral). Two items checked the 
success of the virality manipulation (i.e., “To what extent did the tweet gain support over time?” 
and “To what extent did this tweet influence people?”), four checked the perceived following 
size of each account (“How would you describe the size of this person’s Twitter following?” 1 
Extremely small – 5 Extremely large), and four checked the perceived ideology of each account 
(Very liberal – Very Conservative)   
After each tweet participants indicated how outraged it made them feel using four items 
adapted from Tetlock et al., (2003) (i.e., angry, offended, outraged, upset; anchors = Not at all - 
Very much). As filler items, participants also completed two measures for how satisfied they felt 
(satisfied and pleased), two for fear (afraid and threatened), and two for surprise (surprised and 
caught off guard). Lastly, two items assessed subjective likelihood of commenting (i.e., “If you 
saw this on Twitter would you feel the need to speak up?” and “If you saw this on Twitter how 
likely would you be to write a reply?”). All items used 7 – point scales except where otherwise 
indicated.  
Results 
I first examined effects upon manipulation checks. A 2 (high vs low follower count) x 3 
(reply backlash, vs downvote backlash vs control) mixed ANOVA (virality was not entered as a 
variable because it was manipulated after participants rated the following size of the accounts) 
indicated that the follow count manipulation was successful. Participants perceived the accounts 
with high followers as having a larger following (M = 3.73, SE = .05) than the perceived 
accounts with low followers (M = 2.03, SE = .04), F(1, 237) = 898.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .79. The 
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Figure 3. The positive effect of virality upon perceived impact is attenuated in the presence of 
hypothetical downvotes, but not by information that is present on Twitter (large numbers of 
replies).  
 
follow count by backlash type interaction suggested that this difference was consistent across 
conditions, F(1, 237) = 1.03, p = .36, ηp
2 = .01.  I next examined the perceived ideology of the 
Twitter accounts. Participants who saw offensive right-wing tweets (i.e., participants who  
indicated they leaned Democrat) perceived the offensive right-wing twitter accounts as 
conservative (M = 6.27, SE = .07) to an almost exactly equal degree that Republican leaning 
participants perceived the offensive left-wing tweeters as liberal (M = 1.87, SE = .11). A 2 
(follower count) x 2 (lean Democrat vs lean Republican) x 3 (backlash type) mixed ANOVA 
suggested that this difference was consistent across accounts with high and low follower counts 
(follow count by participant ideology interaction: F(1, 234) = .06, p = .80, ηp
2 < .001). The three-
way, follow count by participant ideology by backlash type interaction was also non-significant, 
F(2, 234) = .86, p = .43, ηp
2 = .01. Lastly, the virality manipulation was checked via a 2 (low vs 
high virality) x 2 (follow count) x 3 (backlash type) mixed ANOVA. As expected, high virality 
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Figure 4. Effects of virality upon all self-reported reactions to politically opposing tweets.  
 
tweets (M = 5.16, SE = .08) were perceived as substantially more supported and influential than 
low virality tweets (M = 1.79, SD = .05), F(1, 237) = 1869.62, p < .001, ηp
2 = .89. The virality by 
backlash type interaction was also significant F(2, 237) = 27.56, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19. The effect of 
virality upon perceived impact was substantially smaller in the downvote backlash conditions 
than the neutral or reply backlash conditions (see Figure 2 for estimated marginal means). 
 To test Hypotheses 1-3, I conducted a 2 (follow count) x 2 (virality) x 2 (backlash type) 
mixed ANOVA with outrage as the dependent variable. Supporting H1, viral tweets evoked 
significantly more outrage than non-viral tweets (low virality: M = 3.97, SE = .12; high virality: 
M = 4.22, SE = .12, F(1, 237) = 8.85, p = .003, ηp
2 = .04. However, in contrast with H2, follow 
count did not impact outrage, F(1, 237) = .009, p = .92, ηp
2 < .001, nor did it moderate the effect 
of virality, F(1, 237) = .02, p = .89, ηp
2 < .001. The effect of virality also did not significantly 
differ across backlash type (virality by backlash type interaction: F(2, 237) = .58, p = .56, ηp
2 = 
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.01); thus, H3 was also not supported. However, examining simple effects revealed suggestive 
evidence of virality affecting outrage differently in the control vs downvote backlash conditions. 
When no information of backlash was provided, the effect of virality trended in the low follower 
(ΔM = .32, SE = .19, p = .08), not the high follower conditions (ΔM = .03, SE = .20, p = .89). But 
when tweets were accompanied by downvotes, the effect of virality trended in the high follower 
conditions (ΔM = .36, SE = .21, p = .08), not the low follower conditions (ΔM = .01, SE = .19, p 
= .95). Furthermore, an exploratory mixed ANOVA, dropping the reply backlash condition, 
produced a marginal follow count by virality by backlash type interaction, F(1, 237) = 3.09, p = 
.08, ηp
2 = .02. Thus the effect of virality may differ slightly across conditions, but the present 
evidence of this is merely suggestive.   
Effects upon an alternative outcome, desire to act, followed a similar pattern to results for 
outrage but had slightly stronger effects. Viral tweets produced a significantly stronger desire to 
act (M = 3.41, SE = .12) than non-viral tweets (M = 2.92, SE = .12),  F(1, 237) = 28.41, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .11. However, as with outrage, follower count of the offensive tweeter did not impact the 
desire to act F(1, 237) = .01, p = .91, ηp
2 < .001, nor did it moderate the effects of virality F(1, 
237) = 2.82, p = .16, ηp
2 = .01. Examining effects upon the remaining filler, self-reported feelings 
revealed similar effects of virality upon fear (ΔM = .25, SE = .07, p = .001) and surprise (ΔM = 
.31, SE = .08, p < .001), but not satisfaction (ΔM = .001, SE = .07, p = .99) 
Lastly, an exploratory analysis examined differences across participants who leaned 
Republican vs those who leaned Democrat. Results from the 2 (follow count) x 2 (virality) x 3 
(backlash type) x 2 (Democrat vs Republican) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant three-way 
interaction between follow count, virality, and participant ideology, F(1, 234) = 4.32, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .02. For Democrats, the viral tweets evoked more outrage (relative to non-viral tweets) when 
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the tweet author had a large Twitter following (ΔM = .44, SE = .14, p = .001) and a small Twitter 
following (ΔM = .24, SE = .13, p = .07). For Republicans, the effect of virality trended in a 
positive direction for accounts with small followings (ΔM = .23, SE = .20, p = .20) and in a 
negative direction for accounts with large followings (ΔM = -.28, SE = .21, p = .21). In sum, the 
effect of virality was more consistent in participants who leaned Democrat. Dropping people 
who leaned Republican increased the effect size of virality upon outrage from ηp
2 = .04 to ηp
2 = 
07. Notably, the sample contained fewer Republicans (n = 71) than Democrats (n = 169).  
Discussion 
 In Study 1, tweets from political opponents that accumulated high numbers of likes and 
retweets (i.e., high virality) generated significantly more outrage and the desire to reply than 
tweets that accumulated low number of likes and retweets (supporting H1). This effect persisted 
even when the offensive tweets received large numbers of downvotes. Apparent backlash, in the 
form of downvotes, did make the viral tweets seem less impactful. However, this did not appear 
to reduce participants’ outrage or desire to respond (in contrast with H3). Furthermore, the 
number of followers each account had did not impact outrage or desire to reply, nor did it 
moderate the effects of virality upon outrage (in contrast with H3). Effects were also more 
consistent among participants who leaned Democrat than those who leaned Republican (in fact 
dropping the latter from analyzes nearly doubled the effect size of virality upon outrage). In sum, 
Study 1 provided evidence of a small effect of virality upon both felt outrage and the desire to 
reply, but little evidence of an effect of following size or apparent backlash.  
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STUDY 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate the effect of virality upon outrage in real world conversations 
on Twitter. Rather than measuring self-reported outrage, Study 2 employs a dictionary-based 
method to detect the presence of anger and moral emotional language in cross ideological and 
ideological homogenous interactions. Thus Study 2 builds upon Study 1 by testing the effects of 
virality (H1) and actual following size (H2) upon moral emotional language in real world 
behavior and by comparing interactions between ideological similar (e.g., conservatives with 
conservatives) and ideologically dissimilar (i.e., conservatives with liberals) pairs of users. 
Method 
Data Collection 
 Tweets containing the word “abortion” were collected using the Twitter streaming API in 
the wake of the Alabama abortion bill, passed on May 14th of 2019. Tweets were collected on 
May 16th. First, only top-level tweets (i.e., tweets that are not replies to other tweets) were 
retained, resulting in an original corpus of 153,412 tweets. To narrow the sample down to 
comment threads more likely to contain at least one cross-ideological interaction, tweets with 
fewer than 3 replies were excluded. The overwhelming majority of tweets had no replies (n = 
109,160) or only 1 reply (n = 31,824; many of which were users replying to themselves). Thus 
this step alone substantially reduced the size of the corpus of top-level tweets (5,676 top-level 
tweets in total). Over the following week I used the Twitter search API to collect replies to users 
in the data set from May 16th to the 18th. I then matched replies to their corresponding top-level 
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tweets, excluding tweets that were replies to other replies in each tweet thread (a thread refers to 
a top-level tweet, all of its direct replies, and replies to other replies within the thread). If a user 
replied more than once to the same tweet, I only kept their first reply. This resulted in an original 
sample of 84,190 direct replies to top-level tweets. Lastly, because I was most interested in how 
people responded to top-level tweets, I only retained the first 30 replies to minimize how other 
replies may have impacted the conversation over time. The final corpus consisted of 5,676 tweets 
and 44,215 replies.  
Estimating Political Ideology of Twitter Accounts 
 The ideology of user accounts was estimated using a previously validated computational 
model (Barbera, 2015; Barbera, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015), implemented in the 
“tweetscores” package in R. For example, previous validation studies have shown ideology 
estimates derived from this model predict real world political party registration with over 90% 
accuracy (Barbera, 2015). The model infers users’ political ideology based on the assumption 
that people prefer to follow politicians with similar ideologies of their own. In other words, the 
accounts someone choose to follow on Twitter contain information about their personal 
ideology. Barbera’s (2015) original paper contained two stages for estimating ideology, one 
estimating the political ideology of a set of political elites and a second stage estimating the 
ideology of 32 million Twitter users across six countries based on the political elites they follow. 
One limitation of this original method was that users had to follow at least one political elite to 
estimate their ideology, leading to substantial loss of data. A later paper (Barbera et al., 2015) 
expanded the list of followed accounts used to estimate ideology from political elites (e.g., 
congress people and presidents) to accounts commonly followed by liberals and conservatives 
(e.g., Stephen Colbert and Rush Limbaugh). Ideology scores for this expanded list of political 
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accounts are normalized to follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one. The pre-estimated ideology of accounts in the tweetscores package, used to 
estimate the ideology of Twitter users in the present data, were last updated in October of 2018. 
Lists of followed accounts for all Twitter accounts in the present data were collected through the 
Twitter API from December 2019 to January 2020. Ideology estimates were obtained using the 
“estimateIdeology2()” function in the tweetscores R package (which implements the ideology 
estimation procedure using the expanded list of political accounts described in Barbera et al., 
2015).  
 After obtaining ideology scores for tweets and replies, replies were classified as 
ideologically cross-cutting if the ideology estimate of the replying user had the opposite sign as 
the ideology of the user who posted the original tweet (e.g., a user with an ideology of -.5 
replying to a user with an ideology of .5 represented a liberal replying to a conservative). Replies 
were classified as ideologically homogeneous if the replying user and original tweeter had 
ideology estimates of the same sign. Ideology estimates were successfully obtained for 7,363 
cross-cutting replies and 14,729 homogeneous replies.  
Language Analysis 
All tweets were pre-processed by removing URLs, emoticons, hashtags, punctuation, 
numbers, and extra white space. Only Tweets with 10 or more words were included in analyses. 
The text of each tweet was analyzed using a dictionary-based approach following Brady and 
colleagues’ (2017) similar analysis of moral-emotional language on Twitter. All tweets and 
replies were scored on anger and moral language by calculating the proportion of each tweet 
composed of words from validated dictionaries (anger dictionary: n = 329 words; negative 
moral-emotional dictionary: n = 38; positive moral-emotional: n = 20; Brady et al., 2017; 
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Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). For example, a 
reply reading “I hate Trump!!! #impeach” would be split into four words “I,” “hate,” “Trump,” 
and “impeach” and assigned an anger score of .25 because one word (hate) out of four is in the 
anger dictionary. Primary analyses focus on results for anger and negative moral-emotional 
language because they map most directly onto moral outrage. Dictionaries for negative and 
positive moral emotional language were taken from Brady et al., (2017), who constructed them 
from overlapping words in validated dictionaries of negative affect, positive affect, and moral 
words. The moral language dictionary is located in Appendix E (note that the full anger 
dictionary from LIWC is not included in appendices because it is proprietary).  
Predictors 
Predictor variables included the number of followers of authors of top-level tweets, the 
number of likes and retweets received by each tweet top-level tweet, and the number of replies to 
each tweet top-level tweet. A virality score was calculated by standardizing and averaging the 
number of retweets and likes.  
Results 
 To mitigate the influence of a small number of highly viral tweets in the data set, top-
level tweets with virality scores three standard deviations above the mean were removed from 
the data set. Follower counts were rescaled by taking the natural logarithm to adjust for the 
extremely wide range of followers (0 to 45,196,481).  
 While some replies in the data set were not clustered with other tweets (for example, 24% 
of top-level tweets only had a single reply and 44% had two), many replies were nested within 
the same top-level tweet. To check whether multi-level modeling was necessary to account for 
potential non-independence, random effects only models were estimated for anger, negative 
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moral-emotional, and positive moral-emotional language scores, entering only a tweet 
identification number as a random effect. Intra-class correlations for models predicting anger 
(ICC = .05), negative moral emotional (ICC = .05), and positive moral emotional words (ICC = 
.02) were all low, suggesting that multi-level models to account for non-independence were not 
necessary (Dyer, Hanges, & Hall, 2005; Hox, 2002). Thus for the primary analyses I report the 
results of linear regressions.1 
 Regressions predicting anger, negative moral-emotional language, and positive moral-
emotional language within replies were run in three steps. The first step entered virality score of 
the top-level tweet, the log transformed number of followers of the account belonging to the top-
level tweet, and whether the reply was cross ideological or ideologically homogeneous. The 
second step entered all three two-way interactions, and the third step entered the three-way 
interaction. Detailed model results are provided in Table 2.  
In support of Hypothesis 1, the effect of virality upon anger words and negative moral 
emotional language was moderated by whether the reply was cross-cutting or homogeneous 
(interaction effects for anger and negative moral emotional language respectively: b =-.42, p = 
.003 and b =-.30, p = .004). In cross cutting interactions, more viral tweets were targeted with 
angrier (b = .44, p < .001) and negatively moral (b = .28, p < .001) replies. No such relationship 
existed in homogeneous interactions (b = .02, p = .84 and b = -.02, p = .77 for anger and negative 
moral words respectively). The interaction between log transformed follower count and cross-
cutting (vs homogeneous) was also significant for anger (b = .03, p = .03) and negative moral 
language (b = .04, p < .001). However, the simple effects did not follow the pattern predicted by  
 
1 As a robustness check, I estimated multi-level models for all key results, entering tweet ID as a random effect and 
predictors (virality score, follower count, and cross-cutting vs homogeneous) as level 2 fixed effects. No results 
differed substantively across this analytic approach and the linear regressions reported in the primary analyses.  
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Note: Model statistics are provided at three steps: 1) predictors entered with no interactions 2) 
predictors with all 2-way interactions 3) predictors, two-way interactions, and the three-way 
interaction.  
 
Hypothesis 2. In cross-cutting interactions, log follower count was associated with marginally 
less anger (b = -.02, p = .05) and negative moral language (b = -.01, p = .11). But follower count 
was positively associated with negative moral language (b = .03, p < .001) in homogenous  
interactions (and not associated with anger, b = .01, p = .27). No effects were observed upon 
positive moral language (see Table 2 for detailed results). 
Table 1. Relationships between tweet metadata and anger/moral-emotional language 
Outcome Predictor b (SE) p Model statistics 
Anger Virality 0.17 (0.7) .011* 
R2. = 0004,  
F(3,21875) = 2.68, p = .05 
 Follower count  -.003 (0.01) .652 
 Reply type -0.02 (0.01) .232 
 Virality x Followers -0.02 (.02) .465 
R2. = 0010,  
F(6,21873) = 3.68, p = .001 
 Virality x Reply type -0.42 (0.14) .003* 
 Followers x Reply type .03 (0.02) .027* 
 
Virality x Followers x 
Reply type 
-0.07 (0.04) .077 R2 = .0012,  
F(7,21871) = 3.60, p < .001 
 
Negative Virality 0.10 (0.05) .052 
R2. = 0006,  
F(3,21875) = 4.02, p = .007 
Moral Follower count  .01 (0.01) .065 
 Reply type  -0.06 (0.03) .033 
 Virality x Followers -0.02 (0.02) .244 
R2. = 0017,  
F(6,21873) = 6.17, p < .001 
 Virality x Reply type -0.30 (0.10) .004* 
 Followers x Reply type .04 (0.01) < .001* 
 
Virality x Followers x 
Reply type 
-0.06 (0.03) .063 R2 = .0018,  
F(7,21871) = 5.78, p < .001 
 
Positive Virality 0.01 (0.03) .723 
R2. < 0001,  
F(3,21875) = .50, p = .70 
Moral Follower count  -0.003 (0.004) .423 
 Reply type  .02 (0.03) .389 
 Virality x Followers -0.02 (0.01) .138 
R2. = .0002,  
F(6,21872) = .85, p = .53 
 Virality x Reply type .09 (0.07) .206 
 Followers x Reply type <.001 (0.1) .994 
 
Virality x Followers x 
Reply type 
-0.01 (0.22) .654 R2 = .0002,  
F(7,21871) = .76, p = .62 
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Three-way interactions between virality score, log transformed follower count, and cross-
cutting (vs homogeneous) were marginal for anger (b -.07, p = .08) and negative moral language 
(b -.06, p = .06). Interestingly, the virality by reply type (cross-cutting vs homogeneous) were 
slightly exaggerated at high follower counts (effect of virality among cross-cutting replies: b .55, 
p < .001; among homogeneous: b -.12, p = .31) compared to low follower counts (effect of 
virality among cross-cutting replies: b = .38, p = .004; among homogeneous: b = .12, p = .21) 
for anger. Negative moral language exhibited this same pattern. The interaction between virality 
and reply type was slightly more pronounced at high follower counts (effect of virality among 
cross-cutting replies: b .35, p = .003; among homogeneous: b -.14, p = .11) than low follower 
counts (effect of virality among cross-cutting replies: b = .31, p < .001; among homogeneous: b 
.09, p = .66).  
Secondary Analyses  
Outrage Amplifying Effects of Virality. Despite excluding tweets with fewer than 10 
words, a substantial number of replies contained no words in the anger or negative moral 
emotional word dictionaries. This produced substantial clustering at zero in both primary 
outcome variables. As a secondary analysis, I re-ran the same regressions excluding tweets with 
no anger and no negative moral emotional words, reducing the sample of replies to 6,595 and 
3,888 in the regressions predicting anger and negative moral words respectively. In other words, 
these analyses only include tweets exhibiting some degree of anger or moral language. Thus 
these tests may represent effects of virality upon outrage amplification rather than origination.  
 Using this smaller sample, the two-way interactions between virality and reply type no 
longer had significant effects upon anger (b = -.37, p = .19) or negative moral emotional 
language (b = -.51, p = .13). Likewise, the interactions between follower count and reply type no 
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Figure 5. Relationship between virality and moral-emotional language in ideologically cross-
cutting and homogeneous replies. Small and large Twitter followings represent effects estimated 
at one standard deviation below and above the mean log transformed follower count. Scores for 
anger and moral language are proportion of words in tweets from validated dictionaries for moral 
and negative moral-emotional language. Data excludes replies with zero anger and negative 
moral-emotional words.  
 
longer affected anger (b = 0.01, p = .64) or negative moral words (b = .03, p = .39). However, the 
effects of the three-way interactions were substantially larger in this sample. The final model 
predicting anger (i.e., containing all three predictors, two-way interactions, and the three-way  
interaction) was significant, F(7, 6563) = 5.16, p < .001, R2 = .01, as was the three-way 
interaction, b = -.32, SE = .08, p = < .001. Probing the interaction revealed that the hypothesized 
interaction between virality and reply type only emerged among replies to accounts with large 
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twitter followings. For accounts with relatively low numbers of followers, virality predicted 
increases in anger among both cross ideological replies (b = .52, p = .02) and homogenous 
replies (b = .81, p < .001). However, at high follower counts, not only was the effect of virality 
among cross-cutting replies substantially larger (b = 1.37, p < .001), virality no longer predicted 
anger among homogeneous replies (b = -.09, p = .70). Results for negative moral emotional 
language followed a similar pattern. Again, the final step of the model was significant, F(7, 
3,865) = 4.508, p < .001, R2 = .01, as was the three-way interaction, b = -.35, SE = .10, p = < 
.001. At low follower-counts, virality did not predict increased use of negative moral language 
among either cross-cutting (b = .33, p = .21) or homogeneous replies (b = .49, p = .08). However, 
at high follower counts, the predicted interaction emerged. Among cross-cutting replies, virality 
predicted greater user of negative moral emotional language (b = 1.55, p < .001), while there was 
no effect of virality among homogenous replies (b = -.32, p = .31) (see Figure 3 for 
visualizations of interactions). 
Negative Binomial Models of Word Counts. The previous analyses calculated the 
proportion of anger and negative moral emotional within in each tweet (i.e., by dividing the 
number of words from each dictionary by the total number of words in the corresponding tweet). 
While this approach is common (for example, it is the default output of the LIWC software) and 
has been previously applied to tweets (Eichstaedt et al., 2015; Jordan, Pennebaker, & Ehrig, 
2018), other approaches analyze word counts without calculating proportions (e.g., Brady, et al. 
2017). Both methods have their own limitations. Proportions control for the fact that longer 
tweets are more likely to contain words from the given dictionary by virtue of their length. 
However, they may also underestimate a sentiment, such as anger, among twitter users who tend 
to write longer sentences. As a robustness check, I also present analyses of word counts. 
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Furthermore, analyzing count data allows for the use of discrete probability distributions, such as 
the negative binomial, that are effective at modeling the skewed, zero-inflated characteristics of 
the present outcome variables.  
 I first estimated Poisson models to test for the presence of overdispersion (i.e., whether 
the standard deviation of the outcome variable substantially exceeded its mean). The Poisson 
distribution assumes that the mean and variance are equal. If this assumption is violated, then 
negative binomial regression is appropriate. Using the AER package in R to implement the test 
of overdispersion describe by Cameron and Trivedi (1990), both anger (α = .32, z = 14.86, p < 
.001) and negative moral-emotional (α = .37, z = 12.48, p < .001) word counts exhibited 
significant overdispersion, thus negative binomial regressions were used to model word counts.  
Results were similar to those analyzing proportions. Type of reply moderated the effects 
of virality upon anger words, b = -.24, SE  = .08, z = 2.61, p = .002. In cross-ideological replies, 
virality predicted significantly more anger words, b = .21, SE  = .06, z = 3.63, p < .001. On 
average, a tweet with a virality score of three was predicted to contain twice as many anger 
words than tweets with a virality score of zero (see Figure 4). No such effect was observed in 
homogenous replies, b = -.02, SE  = .05, z = -.27, p =.64. Reply type also moderated the 
relationship between virality and number of negative moral-emotional words, b = -.30, SE  = .10, 
z = -2.86, p = .004. Virality predicted negative moral words in cross-cutting replies, b = .26, SE  
= .08, z = 3.27, p < .001, but not homogeneous replies, b = -.04, SE  = .07, z = -.61, p = .54. 
Similar to the results for anger, the predicted number of negative moral-emotional words in 
replies to tweets with a virality score of three was twice that of tweets with virality scores of 
zero. Neither the three-way interaction predicting anger, b = -.02, SE  = .02, z = -.85, p = .39, or 
negative moral words was significant, b = -.05, SE  = .03, z = -1.56, p = .12.  
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Figure 6. Relationship between virality and moral emotional language word counts modeled via 
negative binomial regression.  
 
Discussion 
 Study 2 successfully replicated the effect of virality upon outrage in real world behavior 
on Twitter. Replies to political outgroups on Twitter were significantly angrier and used more 
uniquely moral, negative emotion words for viral than non-viral tweets (supporting H1). This 
effect was robust to multiple statistical approaches. Moreover, a secondary analysis focusing on 
moral outrage amplification rather than origination, revealed not only a substantially larger effect 
of virality upon angry and moral emotional language, but a moderating role of following size. 
Among accounts with few followers, the effect of virality upon anger and negative moral 
language was relatively small and did not differ across homogeneous and cross-cutting replies. 
However, viral posts from accounts with large followings evoked significantly more outrage and 
this effect only emerged in ideologically cross-cutting replies. While this may not provide direct 
support for the hypothesized positive relationship between following size and outrage (H2), 
following size may play an important role in determining when viral tweets evoke outrage. When 
users with small followings happen to go viral, they may attract relatively little negative, moral-
emotional language. But when hugely influential political opponents post on moral topics, the 
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threat of virality may loom especially large, prompting the use of specifically moral, negative 
emotional language to combat the spread of opposing ideas.   
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STUDY 3 
 Studies 1 and 2 found that people feel and express outrage in response to viral content 
from political outgroups. I theorize that outrage is both felt in response to seeing opposing ideas 
gain favor and expressed to combat the spread of those ideas. One limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is 
that they do not distinguish between subjective feelings of outrage and behavioral expressions of 
outrage. It is possible, for example, that people use outrage strategically as a tool to suppress 
opposing ideas or to signal their personal virtues without feeling outraged subjectively. Study 3 
has three goals. First, it tests whether outrage expressions increase when people have an explicit 
goal of coordinating against an opponent, even in the absence of shifts subjectively felt outrage. 
Second, it tests whether the explicit motivation to coordinate people against an opponent entails 
greater uses of outrage than the explicit motivation to personally gain social rewards on social 
media (e.g., likes or upvotes) (a test of Hypothesis 4). Third, I test whether anonymous (vs 
identified) digital contexts make people feel even more free to express outrage when trying to 
prevent the spread of opposing ideas.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure  
Again, a sample size of 320 was set to detect effect sizes of d = .4 between independent 
groups in the design with power of .80. Data collection fell short of this goal, with an initial total 
of 217 participants (Mage = 20.43, 180 Women, 36 Men, and 1 who selected other but did not 
identify their gender) collected from the USF psychology participant pool. Participants were told 
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they were taking part in a study of online interactions in which they would read comments from 
other USF students, write replies, and upvote/downvote other responses. Half of participants 
were instructed to write comments they thought would increase the number of downvotes 
another person’s comment to received downvotes; half wrote comments they though would 
cause them to receive upvotes themselves. See instructions below (text altered between 
conditions is underlined with differences in brackets): 
“We are studying how effective people are at manipulating the number of likes or 
upvotes they receive on social media. We've collected some comments from other USF 
students about campus life. We want you to write some replies for us to show participants 
in a future study, and we will test whether people upvote your comments [your comments 
make the person you are replying to receive more downvotes]. In other words, on the 
following pages we want you to write replies that you think will make people upvote 
your comments [cause people to downvote the person you are replying to].”  
Participants were then randomly assigned to read that their replies will be anonymous vs. 
identified: 
“Below is an image of how your comment will appear to future participants. USF 
students participating in our future studies will read the replies you write as depicted 
below. It is important for you to know that your real name will appear next to the 
comments that you write, making your identity known to future participants who read 
whatever replies you write [It is important for you to know that we will collect no data 
about your identity. Whatever replies you write will be completely anonymous and your 
identity will be unknown to future participants].” 
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Below these instructions was a screenshot of a photoshopped comment section, 
illustrating how their comment would appear. Each prompt was following an attention check. To 
ensure participants understood the task, participants first had to summarize, in their own words, 
the goal of the comment they were supposed to write. Response were coded as “pass” if they 
correctly summarized the goal of their comment (to make others upvote you vs. make others 
downvote someone else) and coded as “fail” otherwise. The second attention check (for 
anonymity) asked participants to indicate what would appear next to their comment. Choices 
included, “Your real name,” “A profile picture,” “Your year in school,” and “There will be no 
identifying information whatsoever.” All participants who failed at least one attention check 
were excluded from analysis (see Appendix F for full manipulation materials).  
 Participants read two comments about “USF life,” ostensibly written by other students. 
To help participants get acquainted with the task and to mask the purpose of the study, 
participants first read a neutral comment designed to elicit minimal outrage reading, “I like the 
set up for the gym a lot but oh my god does it get crowded in there. Have to stand around 
awkwardly for 10 mins just to get a bench some days.” The second, offensive comment, gave 
students the opportunity to express moral outrage, “Wow was not expecting for there to be 
soooooo many black people here. Nothing wrong with that just not used to it. Weird.” See 
Appendix G for comment materials. 
Measures 
 After reading each comment, participants were asked if they wanted to 1 – upvote, 2 – 
downvote, or 3 – do nothing. All participants were then asked to write a reply to each comment. 
The primary dependent variables were outrage and moral conviction expressed in participants’ 
replies to the offensive comment. Two independent raters (both of whom identified as White) 
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each coded comments for outrage, moral conviction, and a third, exploratory variable, mockery. 
Coding instructions contained the original comments to which participants responded. Outrage 
was described to raters as a mix of condemnation and emotions such as anger and disgust 
(Skitka, 2010; Tetlock et al., 2003). Coders rated outrage on a four-point scale (0 – Not at all 
outraged, to 3 – a strong degree of outrage). Perceived moral language was coded on an item 
adapted from Skitka’s (2010) measure of moral conviction (i.e., The commenter expresses their 
moral convictions, 0 – No at all  to 3 – The comment seemed strongly tied to their moral beliefs 
and convictions). Lastly, raters coded for mockery (i.e., The commenter mocks the original 
comment 0 – Not at all to 3 – The entire comment is blatantly parodying or making fun of the 
other user). Full coding instructions are provided in Appendix H.  
 Following guidelines from Hallgren (2012), inter-rater reliability was assessed via intra-
class correlations in the irr package in R. I specified a two-way model (since both raters rated all 
comments, i.e., the design was fully crossed) focusing on consistency (rather than absolute 
agreement), and indicating that the final measures used for outrage, moral language, and 
mockery were the means of both coders rating. ICCs for outrage (.88) and mockery (.90) 
indicated strong agreement, while the ICC for moral conviction showed only moderate reliability 
(.68).  
 Lastly, participants completed the same self-report measure of subjective outrage as in 
Study 1. 
Results 
All participants who failed either manipulation check or upvoted the offensive comment were 
excluded from analyses. This reduced the sample to 150 participants (Mage = 20.51, 129 Women, 
20 Men, and 1 who selected other but did not identify their gender). Exclusions and 
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Figure 7: Effects of anonymity and comment goal upon each type of coder rated content. 
 
analyses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/n2r7y/. The final sample had .80 power to detect ηp
2 
= .05. A 2 (goal of comment: opponent downvote vs personal upvote goal) by 2 (anonymous vs 
identified) ANOVA, entering outrage as the dependent variable, found a significant main effect 
of comment goal, F(1,146) = 13.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08 (supporting H4), and a marginal effect of 
anonymity, F(1,146) = 2.82, p = .07, ηp
2 = .02 (partial support for H5). Participants with the 
explicit goal of making someone else receive downvotes expressed significantly greater outrage 
(M = 1.49, SD = .88) than participants who tried to receive upvotes (M = .96, SD = .99). 
Anonymous participants (M = 1.37, SD = 1.02)  expressed marginally more outrage than 
identified participants (M = 1.10, SD = .90)  The effect of comment goal was not moderated by 
anonymity F(1,146) = .014, p = .71, ηp
2 < .001. Examining expression of moral conviction, 
participants who tried to inspire downvotes expressed more moral conviction (M = 1.34, SD = 
.83) than participants who tried to receive upvotes (M = .86, SD = .88), F(1,146) = 12.29, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .08. Neither anonymity, F(1,146) = 1.46, p = .23, ηp
2 = .01, nor the anonymity by  
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comment goal interaction affected expressed conviction, F(1,146) = .86, p = .35, ηp
2 = .01. 
Lastly, participants in the downvote condition (M = .82, SD = 1.15) used mockery (M = .49, SD 
= .91) marginally more often than participants in the upvote condition, F(1,146) = 2.82, p = .07, 
ηp
2 = .02. Neither anonymity, F(1,145) = 1.68, p = .20, ηp
2 = .01, nor the anonymity by comment 
goal interaction affected mockery, F(1,145) = .17, p = .68, ηp
2 = < .001. 
Comparing expressed outrage with self-reported outrage found no relationship, r(148) = 
.11, p = .17. Comment goal, F(1,144) = .03, p = .86, ηp
2 < .001, anonymity F(1,144) = .16, p = 
.69, ηp
2 < .001, and the interaction, F(1,144) = .04, p = .85, ηp
2 < .001, all had no effect on self-
reported outrage. While participants expressed substantially greater outrage and moral conviction 
in the downvote conditions, they did not feel any more outrage subjectively nor did outrage 
expression correlate with feeling outrage overall.  
Discussion 
When people explicitly try to coordinate others against someone they disagree with, they 
express substantially greater outrage and moral conviction than when they try to secure upvotes 
for themselves. Anonymity may further increase outrage expression, but the effect of anonymity 
was small and marginally significant. Expressions of outrage shifted substantially despite no 
change in subjective outrage. When people have explicit goals to manipulate public opinion, they 
are more likely to express outrage even if in the absence of increased outrage. I also found 
suggestive evidence that mockery provides an alternative tool for coordinating audiences against 
targets.  
These results do not preclude outrage motivated by implicit goals to improve personal 
reputation (Jordan & Rand, 2019), but they do suggest when people explicitly try to receive 
social rewards online, outrage is not their primary strategy. This is consistent with Jordan and 
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Rand’s (2019) finding that people only use outrage to signal personal reputation when pro-social 
behavior is not an option. However, the present results suggest that improving personal 
reputation (at least in an absolute sense) may not be the primary drive behind digital outrage, as 
efforts to coordinate onlookers against an opponent evokes relatively more outrage expression.  
Notably, ratings of moral conviction suffered from relatively low reliability. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that moral conviction researchers argue self-report is the most 
appropriate method for assessing moral convictions (Skitka, 2010). In other words, when 
someone is criticizing and distancing themselves from another, it can be difficult to tell whether 
they are driven by moral concern versus dislike without asking them. Thus results for moral 
conviction should be interpreted with caution. Lastly, while subjective and expressed outrage did 
not correlate overall, among people who expressed any degree of outrage (i.e., people who either 
rater score as a 1 or higher on outrage), both outrage indicators correlated at r(110) = .26, p = 
.006. Thus, among people who expressed outrage, feeling outrage more intensely predicted more 
extreme expressions of outrage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Common sense suggests that offensive ideas trigger outrage because of their content. 
However, the present studies provide evidence that digital outrage is not only about the offensive 
content we see; it is about the potential for that content to spread and gain influence. In Study 1, 
animations of offensive tweets going viral (compared to similarly offensive, non-viral tweets) 
triggered subjective outrage and an increased desire to respond. Study 2 compared real-world 
cross-ideological interactions to homogeneous interactions on Twitter. When talking to people 
with the same ideology, receiving high numbers of retweets and likes had little impact on 
outrage. Unsurprisingly, seeing the ideas of people who share our worldview spread does not 
predict angry replies. However, when replying to users with a different ideology, greater virality 
predicted angrier and more negative moral-emotional replies. Furthermore, results suggested that 
the difference between cross-cutting and homogeneous interactions was more pronounced in 
replies to especially influential twitter users. Lastly, Study 3 demonstrated that people 
strategically use outrage when they consciously try to coordinate audiences against someone else 
(relative to when they try to receive upvotes themselves). Results also suggested anonymity may 
increase the strategic use of outrage slightly further. Combined these results demonstrate that 
outrage is triggered by the threat of viral, opposing views and used consciously as a strategic tool 
to inhibit their spread.  
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The Roots of Digital Outrage 
These results suggest that the information social media communicate about the spread of 
ideas may be one driver of digital outrage. I theorize that quantified, public markers of social 
rewards, such as likes and retweets, contain valuable information about social consensus. 
Outrage is one of our most valuable tools for coordinating and building consensus around our 
side in disagreements. When social media bombards us with information about the spread of 
opposing values, we feel and express outrage to secure the moral high ground.  
Virtue signaling suggests an alternative explanation for the present results. In Study 2, it 
is possible that Twitter users replied with more outrage to viral tweets because they felt they 
provided the best opportunities to signal personal reputation. In other words, perhaps Tweets that 
are getting more attention seem like the best opportunity to signal personal virtues through 
outrage. Similarly in Study 1, perhaps the effects of virality upon subjective outrage reflected 
people following a heuristic that responding with outrage to viral content is a good strategy for 
signaling reputation. This alternative explanation is difficult to rule out. In fact, the argument that 
outrage is always, to some degree, driven by an implicit goal to make oneself look better borders 
on unfalsifiable. However, it is unlikely that the prevalence of outrage expression reduces to one 
theoretical explanation. People condemn and blame others for a variety of reasons. The desire to 
signal personal reputation undoubtedly motivates some of the outrage that takes place on social 
media. However, witnessing opposing content go viral increases the motivation to act; claiming 
that those motivations are always implicitly linked to self-promotion is reductive and ignores 
other perspective on condemnation that offer more straightforward explanations. Condemnation 
accomplishes more than just signaling virtue. It impacts the sides people choose in conflict, who 
holds political power, and which policies eventually become reality.  
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Implications for Designing Digital Communities 
 In 2019, Instagram began experimenting with eliminating the like count from their 
platform—allowing users to see their own, but the not the tally of likes others receive. Adam 
Mosseri, CEO of Instagram, indicated the change was “about creating a less pressured 
environment” (Meisenzahl, 2019). The present results may lend additional support to Mosseri’s 
rationale. Not only do likes signal information about how people view one’s personal posts, they 
communicate how the ideas of our opponents spread and gain influence. In political contexts this 
may subjectively raise the stakes of cross-cutting conversations. It is not just personal reputation 
that is on the line. When beliefs we see as dangerous go on to gain support and spread virally, we 
may feel like stopping their spread partly depends upon what we say in response. The present 
results demonstrate that when consciously trying to coordinate audiences against a target, we 
become increasingly outraged.  
 Masking like and retweet buttons seem like a natural solution to these problems, but 
design considerations should holistically consider their social psychological effects. The like 
button also has many positive qualities. It allows us to show our support for friends who need it, 
to voice our opinion and democratically afford power to the movements we support, and to filter 
information by topics that are having the most social impact. Design choices should consider all 
of the ways like buttons impact how we interact with and consume information. However, for 
interactions specifically involving people who disagree politically, the negative impacts of like 
buttons may more clearly outweigh the positives. Understanding people across the political 
divide is already an incredibly difficult task for most people. Keeping score of who is “winning” 
the conversation is unlikely to make cross-cutting conversations any easier. Thus digital 
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environments hoping to foster productive and diverse political conversations should consider 
how likes and upvotes may inhibit civility.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The present studies provide evidence from a variety of samples (university students, 
Mechanical Turk worker and Twitter users) and contexts (online surveys and real-world social 
media platforms). However, they are not without limitations. First, the effect size of virality upon 
outrage was small in both studies 1 and 2. It is possible, however, that the effect of virality does 
not primarily manifest as subjectively felt outrage (as measured in Study 1). Instead, virality may 
have a larger impact upon the expression of outrage. Study 3, for example, observed increased 
outrage expression in the absence of differences in subjective outrage. This may suggest that 
outrage expression is performative and strategic. Alternatively, people may be reluctant to admit 
that offensive content has upset them, limiting the effectiveness of self-report outrage measures. 
Small effect sizes were also observed in Study 2. However, lexicon-based methods of text 
analyses (such as those used in Study 2) are known to have more error than other methods of 
sentiment analyses, such as machine learning classifiers (Hailong & Wenyan, 2018). Although 
they also have advantages such as not requiring human labeled training data which is subject to 
bias. In short, text analysis of moral language is still in its infancy, and errors in measurement 
make estimating effect sizes precisely difficult.  
Study 1 failed to find the predicted attenuating effect of downvotes upon outrage, despite 
decreasing the perceived impact of the offensive tweets. Since Twitter does not have a downvote 
button participants had to imagine that one exists. The hypothetical nature of the downvotes 
suggests the present results may underestimate the impact of actual downvotes. Thus the extent 
that downvotes mitigate the threat of virally spreading ideas is not entirely clear. Future studies 
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would benefit from more realistic manipulations or comparisons across existing social media 
platforms that contain (or do not contain) public markers of social disapproval.  
The measure of perceived impact in Study 1 also did not consistently relate to outrage or 
desire to act. Collapsing all ratings of perceived impact and desire to act for each participant, 
perceived impact shared a small, positive relationship with desire to act, r(238) = .16, p  = .01, 
and no relationship with subjective outrage r(238) = .03, p  = .62. This small relationship could 
stem from an issue with how perceived impact was measured. For example, people who find the 
tweet most outrage inducing might also be the most reluctant to admit that the tweet has a large 
amount of support. Alternatively, the effect of virality on reactions could simply be small. An 
effect size of r = .16 is not completely out of line with the size of the observed effect of the 
virality manipulation upon desire to act. 
While the present studies examined the impact of shifts in public markers of approval 
upon outrage, they did not manipulate the mere presence of “likes” or “retweets.” In other words, 
the existence of markers of social approval may trigger more competitive and less civil mindsets 
on its own, even without others’ comments going viral. Future studies could both manipulate the 
presence of “like” and “share” buttons and compare cross-cutting conversations on existing 
social media sites that contain or lack them.  
Study 2 only examined conversations surrounding one political topic. It is possible that 
people use different types of language depending on the issue being discussed. Thus effects of 
virality upon moral language should be replicated in different political topics. Lastly, Study 1 
found suggestive evidence of different effects for liberal versus conservative participants. 
However, the sample size of conservative participants was small, and the materials used for 
conservatives differed from those used for liberals (though they were perceived as equally 
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ideologically extreme). This makes it difficult to draw conclusions about whether the effect of 
virality is ideologically symmetrical. Future research should further explore ideological 
asymmetry in the effects of virality upon outrage. 
Conclusions 
 Slate magazine labelled 2014 “The Year of Outrage.” At the time, mobs of outraged 
tweeters calling for the firing or boycotting of controversial figures felt abnormal. But every year 
since 2014 is likely just as deserving of Slate’s award. Conversations about hot-button issues 
increasingly take place through a computer screen, and the features present in online interactions 
have changed considerably since message boards like usenet reigned supreme. Now when we 
discuss topics tied to our core ideas about right and wrong, everything we say and share is 
accompanied by “points” telling us, and whoever else is watching, exactly what the masses think 
about our side of a dispute. This raises the stakes of conversations about sensitive topics and may 
cause us to use tools that inhibit finding common ground, such as outrage and condemnation, to 
ensure our side comes out on top. As the political climate in the United States grows increasingly 
hostile and polarized (PEW, 2016), we must understand how the contexts of our conversations 
may further impede their productivity. Restricting features that make conversations feel more 
like competitions may be one effective strategy for improve understanding across the ideological 
divide. 
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Appendix A: Study 1 Prescreen 
 
When it comes to politics in general, how would you describe yourself? 
• Very liberal 
• Liberal 
• Somewhat liberal 
• Middle of the Road 
• Somewhat conservative 
• Conservative 
• Very conservative 
 
In general, do you lean more Democrat or Republican? 
• Democrat 
• Republican 
 
For which of the following social media platforms do you have an account (check all that apply)? 
• Twitter  
• Facebook 
• Snapchat 
• Instagram 
 
When did you most recently check Twitter? 
• Never 
• More than a month ago 
• More than a week ago 
• More than a day ago 
• Today 
 
Are you of Hispanic or Latino or Spanish Origin? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
What is your race? 
• American Indian or Alaska Native 
• Asian 
• Black or African American 
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
• White 
• Other 
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Appendix B: Study 1 Text for Outrage Inducing Tweets 
 
Conservative (presented to liberal participants)  
 
 “Murder and assault are spiraling out of control in cities all over the country thanks to 3rd world 
illegals who shouldn’t even be here” 
 
“Sick and tired of seeing gays touching and kissing anytime I turn on the TV. Makes me sick” 
 
“Mothers who murder their unborn babies to avoid the consequences of their actions should be 
locked away in prison. The one’s who do it over and over (serial killers) should get the chair”  
 
 “All these HS kids whining about guns. Psychopaths shooting up schools have nothing to do 
with my 2nd amendment rights.”  
 
Liberal (presented to conservative participants)  
 
“Open borders, abolish ICE, citizenship for illegals, yes to all of it. Anything that stops this 
country from being run by a bunch of old white men” 
 
 “Until the baby is crying outside of the womb, every woman should be able to terminate her 
pregnancy for whatever reason NO QUESTIONS ASKED” 
 
 “Awe poor police officers crying over a taste of their medicine. Next time I hope protesters 
bring more than eggs to throw at them” 
 
“No one has any business owning a gun. For. Any. Reason. They were made for one purpose: 
killing innocent creatures.” 
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Appendix C: Study 1 Tweet Manipulations Examples 
 
Example of high favorite/retweet accumulation; No visible backlash 
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Example of high favorite/retweet accumulation; Downvote backlash 
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Example of high favorite/retweet accumulation; Comment backlash 
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Example of low favorite/retweet accumulation; No backlash 
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Example of low favorite/retweet accumulation; Downvote backlash 
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Example of low favorite/retweet accumulation; Comment backlash 
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Appendix D: Self-reported outcomes and manipulation checks 
 
Study 1 prompt [Study 3 prompt]: 
 
To what extent did what you saw on the previous page make you feel… 
 
[To what extent does the above comment make you feel…] 
 
Not at all angry  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very angry 
Not at all offended  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very offended 
Not at all outraged  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very outraged 
Not at all upset  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very upset 
Not at all satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very satisfied 
Not at all pleased  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very pleased 
Not at all afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very afraid 
Not at all threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very threatened 
 
[Study 1 only] 
If you saw this on Twitter would you feel the need to speak up? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Very much 
 
If you saw this on Twitter how likely would you be to write a reply? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Very likely 
 
Study 1 Manipulation checks: 
 
1) When it comes to politics, what do you think best describes the person who holds the above 
account? 
• Very liberal 
• Liberal 
• Somewhat liberal 
• Middle of the Road 
• Somewhat conservative 
• Conservative 
• Very conservative 
2) How would you describe the size of this person’s Twitter following? 
• Extremely small 
• Small 
• Moderate 
• Large 
• Extremely large 
3) To what extent did the tweet gain support over time? 
1 – Not at all to  7 – Very much 
4) To what extent did this tweet influence people? 
1 – Not at all to  7 – Very much 
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Appendix E: Moral-Emotional Word Dictionaries 
 
benefit* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
 care Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
caring Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
compassion* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
devot* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
faith* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
good Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
goodness Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
heaven* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
hero* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
honest* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
honor* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
ideal* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
loyal* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
peace* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
respect Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
safe* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
save Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
secur* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
value* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
virtue* Positive Moral-Emotional Words 
envy* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
evil* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
fault* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
fight* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
forbid* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
greed* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
gross* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
harm* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
hate Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
hell Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
hurt* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
immoral* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
kill* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
liar* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
murder* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
offend* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
pain Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
protest Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
punish* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
rebel* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
revenge* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
ruin* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
shame* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
sin Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
sinister Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
sins Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
slut* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
spite* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
steal* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
suffer* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
victim* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
vile Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
war Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
warring Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
wars Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
whore* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
wicked* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
wrong* Negative Moral-Emotional Words 
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Appendix F: Study 3 instruction manipulations attention checks 
 
Opponent downvote vs Personal upvote (text altered between conditions is underlined with 
differences in brackets): 
 
“We are studying how effective people are at manipulating the number of likes or 
upvotes they receive on social media. We've collected some comments from other USF 
students about campus life. We want you to write some replies for us to show participants 
in a future study, and we will test whether people upvote your comments [your comments 
make the person you are replying to receive more downvotes]. In other words, on the 
following pages we want you to write replies that you think will make people upvote 
your comments [cause people to downvote the person you are replying to].”  
 
Anonymous vs. Identified:  
 
 “Below is an image of how your comment will appear to future participants. USF 
students participating in our future studies will read the replies you write as depicted 
below. It is important for you to know that your real name will appear next to the 
comments that you write, making your identity known to future participants who read 
whatever replies you write [It is important for you to know that we will collect no data 
about your identity. Whatever replies you write will be completely anonymous and your 
identity will be unknown to future participants].” 
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Attention Check 1:  
In your own words, summarize with one sentence the goal of the comments we want you to write 
on the following pages. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attention Check 2: 
When future participants read the replies you write, what (if anything) will they see next to it? 
 
-your real name 
-a profile picture 
-your year in school 
-there will be no identifying information whatsoever 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Appendix G: Screenshots of online message board shown to participants 
 
Practice Comment; Anonymous: 
 
 
 
Practice Comment; Identified: 
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Outrage Inducing Comment; Anonymous: 
 
 
 
 
Outrage Inducing Comment; Identified: 
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Appendix H: Coding Instructions 
First Comment 
I like the set up for the gym a lot but oh my god does it get crowded in there. Have to stand 
around awkwardly for 10 mins just to get a bench somedays 
Second Comment 
Wow was not expecting for there to be soooo many black people here. Not sure I can get used to 
this. Weird. 
 
Instructions for rating replies: 
How outraged is the person replying? 
0 – Not at all outraged.  
1 – To a small degree, the comment is critical or condemns the original comment, but does not 
contain indicators of emotion 
2 – Moderate, the person clearly finds the comment offensive or transgressive, but their reply 
does not contain indicators of strong emotions or affect. 
3 –  Strong, the person appears to be extremely upset or offended by the content. Reply must 
contain both indicators of strong emotion (“I feel disgusted right now”; “!?!?!?!?!?!?!!!”) and 
condemnation (“what a racist jerk”) 
 
To what extent are they mocking the original comment? 
0 – Not at all mocking. Reply is completely serious  
1 – To a small degree, not outright making fun of the comment, but contains some levity.  
2 – Moderate, makes fun of the comment but also contains some serious elements.  
3 –  Strong, their entire reply is parodying or making fun of the original comment.  
 
To what extent are they expression moral convictions? 
0 – not at all, nothing about their reply seems relevant to their core moral beliefs and convictions 
1—to a small degree 
2 – A moderate amount 
3 – Their comment is explicitly tied to their moral beliefs and convictions 
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Appendix I: Demographics Used in Study 1 and Study Positive Moral Words 
 
What kind of device did you take the survey on? 
• Phone 
• Tablet 
• Laptop 
• Desktop 
 
Type your age (e.g., 21) 
____ 
 
What is you gender?  
• Woman 
• Man 
• Prefer to self-describe 
_________________ 
 
[note that the below items about race and ethnicity were included in the pre-screen of Study 1 
instead of the end of the survey] 
 
Are you of Hispanic or Latino or Spanish Origin? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
What is your race? 
• American Indian or Alaska Native 
• Asian 
• Black or African American 
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
• White 
• Other 
 
Did you find any part of the survey to be confusing or ambiguous? 
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Appendix J: IRB approval letter 
 
 
 
